

General Alex Bolling phoned Deputy Director on 30 April and asked if it was all right not to answer Memo for ID dtd 20 Apr. He said they admit they "loused it up and didn't do it right at all". He said they had set up a new system and the mistake will not be repeated. General Wright agreed no answer to memo was necessary.

J.G.

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Army review(s) completed.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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CSGID 092

14 Apr 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING CHIEF, ESTIMATES GROUP, ONE, CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: The Current Situation in the Free Territory of Trieste
(ONE 23-48)

The Intelligence Division desires that the following dissent
be published with the paper:

"The Intelligence Division, Department of the Army dissents
with the paper as written. The assumption is implicit throughout
the text, and partly expressed on page 1, that the whole interna-
tional dispute over Trieste has been and is a question only of prestige
between East and West. The intrinsic importance of Trieste as a
strategic military asset to its possessor is ignored.

This division believes that, while the strategic importance of
the Trieste area should not be overemphasized, it must, nevertheless,
be taken into account as a material factor in the struggle between
East and West for control of the area. In any Soviet-Yugoslav mili-
tary operation into northern Italy, advance use of the excellent port
facilities and superior communications with the Danubian valley
afforded by physical possession of the city of Trieste, together with
the terrain advantages, would make it possible to assemble a large
force with good logistic support as well as to make naval preparations
in the Adriatic to a much greater extent than would be possible with
the present demarkation line or the present frontier. These advan-
tages would enable the Eastern bloc to accelerate its overrunning of
northern Italy and its eventual control of the entire Italian penin-
sula, to the detriment of any planned counteraction by the western
countries.

Short of war, possession of Trieste would give the Eastern bloc
an opportunity to intensify pressure on Italy in the same proportion
as the enhanced military capabilities described above."

/s/

CARTER W. CLARKE
Carter W. Clarke
Colonel, G.S.C.
Director of Intelligence

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